

SECURITY

BIGGEST DDoS ATTACK IN HISTORY hammers Spamhaus

Plucky mail scrubbers battle internet carpet bombers

BBC

Sign in

News

NEWS TECHNOLOGY

Home World UK England N. Ireland Scotland Wales Business Politics Health Education Sci/Env

27 March 2013 Last updated at 13:03

Share    

Global internet slows after 'biggest attack in history'

Anti-Spoofing and your network: BCP38, SAVI, and what to look for


Mike Hughes, Ethernorth Consultancy

March 2013: Spamhaus attacked




- ❖ Dubbed by some as “biggest attack seen so far” - but debatable
- ❖ Basically a huge “backscatter” attack - reported >300Gb/sec

Anatomy of a Backscatter Attack




Anatomy of a Backscatter Attack



Spoofed Source Address

Easy as writing it on the back of an envelope if you know how (or with the right malware)...

A photograph of a white envelope, slightly tilted, showing a return address label. The label is printed with the text: Apple, 1 Infinite Loop, Cupertino, CA 95014. The envelope is set against a dark, textured background.

Apple
1 Infinite Loop
Cupertino, CA 95014

Anti-Spoofing Measures: BCP38

- ❖ Search “IETF BCP38” for the document
- ❖ Describes current “best practice”
- ❖ Even if seems that it’s not widely followed?



Does anybody care?

- ❖ Industry tries on occasion to raise awareness
- ❖ RIPE Task-Force started in 2006 to raise awareness
- ❖ Disbanded late 2007
- ❖ 5 years on, still banging on about this... really?

You are here: [Home](#) > [RIPE Community](#) > [Groups](#) > [Task Forces](#) > [RIPE IP Anti-Spoofing Task Force](#)

Timeline

— RIPE TASK FORCES

RIPE 52:

BoF and Establishment of Task Force
Quickly draft and publish a RIPE recommendation citing existing work.
Compile How-To with (pointers to) vendor documentation and operational experience reports.
Establish liaison with [MIT ANA Spoofer Project](#) and promote their tools.
Analyse Spoofer data for the RIPE region.

RIPE 53:

Published "RIPE Recommendation on Ingress Filtering".
Published first edition of "Ingress Filtering How-To".
Collect any critical requirements to be communicated to equipment vendors.
First analysis of Spoofer data.
Discuss possible incentive schemes.
Revise and extend How-To.
Devise possible incentive schemes like a "Source Address Clean" network logo, suitable RIPE Database attributes ...

RIPE 54:

Published second edition of "IP Source Address Filtering How-To".
Further analysis of Spoofer data for the RIPE region.
Launch of any incentive scheme.
Implement incentive scheme.
Monitor progress and effectiveness.

RIPE 55:

Evaluation and Disbanding of Task Force.

Why should you care?

- ❖ What's it got to do with me?
- ❖ Running a clean network
- ❖ Doing the “right thing”
- ❖ You pay for your bandwidth, right?
- ❖ Costs of response and cleanup



Applying Anti-Spoofing

- ❖ Easier toward the edge
- ❖ More complex toward the core
- ❖ Common approaches are...
 - ❖ Access list based filtering
 - ❖ uRPF - Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding



Why isn't it deployed?

- ❖ Management of config
- ❖ Cost & time considerations?
- ❖ Because “no-one is demanding it”
- ❖ Perception that it’s “difficult”



IETF “SAVI” effort

- ❖ Search for “IETF SAVI” for more info & working group
- ❖ Currently an informational RFC (6959) as a “problem statement”
- ❖ To make anti-spoofing and source address validation more applicable
- ❖ Thought is that you sanity check at the “downstream” edges
- ❖ Tie anti-spoofing to what is already known about topology

What should you do?

- ❖ BCP38 filter own single-homed downstream customers, hosting networks, etc.
- ❖ Filter your own estate
- ❖ Ask your suppliers to use anti-spoofing measures if they don't already





Ta-Dah!

Questions? Comments? Brickbats?

Mike@ethernorth.net